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Extending the functionality and overcoming the performance limitation under which QKD can
operate requires either quantum repeaters or new security models. Investigating the latter option,
we introduce the Quantum Computational Hybrid (QCH) security model, where we assume that
computationally secure encryption may only be broken after time much longer than the coherence
time of available quantum memories. We propose an explicit d-dimensional key distribution protocol,
that we call MUB-Quantum Computational Timelock (MUB-QCT) where one bit is encoded on a
qudit state chosen among d+ 1 mutually unbiased bases (MUBs). Short-term-secure encryption is
used to share the basis information with legitimate users while keeping it unknown from Eve until
after her quantum memory decoheres. This allows reducing Eve’s optimal attack to an immediate
measurement followed by post-measurement decoding.
We demonstrate that MUB-QCT enables everlasting secure key distribution with input states
containing up to O(
√
d) photons. This leads to a series of important improvements when compared
to QKD: on the functional side, the ability to operate securely between one sender and many
receivers, whose implementation can moreover be untrusted; significant performance increase,
characterized by a O(
√
d) multiplication of key rates and an extension by 25km × log(d) of the
attainable distance over fiber. Implementable with a large number of modes with current or
near-term multimode photonics technologies, the MUB-QCT construction has the potential to
provide a radical shift to the performance and practicality of quantum key distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) enables secure key
agreement with information-theoretic security. This is in
contrast with classical key agreement protocols, where,
security is based on computational hardness conjectures.
QKD can offer in principle a distinctive security advan-
tage over classical techniques, in particular in contexts
where long-term security is sought.
Assessing the usefulness of QKD to serve real-world
use cases in practice still remains a complex and disputed
question. It has led to a debate that is all the more dif-
ficult to settle than different assessment perimeters that
are often considered [1–4]. The difficulty of this compar-
ison is also, to some extent, related to diverse goals that
are being pursued by the researchers and engineers, who
are developing QKD technology.
These goals are in particular structured around the du-
ality between two main dimensions, namely, practicality
(how to build efficient and cost-effective QKD systems)
and security (how to guarantee an effective security gain
with respect to existing classical techniques).
Important efforts, to make progress on both dimen-
sions, have been invested [5]. On the practicality side,
QKD systems have been developed that exhibits in-
creased performances, and are being deployed over real-
world optical networks [6–9]. On the security side, a
strong and stable body of work has been evolved that es-
tablishes theoretical security for QKD [10–12]. Further-
more, the question of implementation security is being
tackled with dedicated efforts [13, 14], paving a way for
the certification of quantum cryptographic implementa-
tions in the near-term.
Despite this remarkable progress, further decisive ad-
vancements are however hindered. This due to the recur-
ring issue that practicality and security aspects of QKD
are, to a large extent, tackled disjointly and leads to a
dilemma: on the one hand, guidelines based on cost-
performance trad-off are expected to drive QKD system
engineering, while on the other hand aspirations for ul-
timate security seem to forbid such an approach. This
observation has already been voiced a decade ago, by
Valerio Scarani and Christian Kurtsiefer in their “black
paper on quantum cryptography” [15]. It however re-
mains essentially unsettled today, which has a negative
impact such as a slowing down QKD progress towards
large-scale adoption and therefore industrialization.
We propose here an approach that aims at addressing
this issue in an alternative way. It consists in leveraging
on short-term computational security and noisy quantum
storage to boost not only the performance and function-
ality but also the implementation security of quantum-
based key establishment. Interestingly, while our pro-
posed model is weaker than the unconditional security,
as offered by QKD, it, however, allows us to offer ever-
lasting security [16], i.e. security of key establishment
against a computationally unbounded provided an initial
ephemeral encrypted communication cannot be broken
within a short time. As everlasting security is not achiev-
able using computational constructions, our hybrid ap-
proach can claim a strict security gain with respect to
classical techniques, in addition to extending the perfor-
mance envelope.
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2II. QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY IN THE
HYBRID SECURITY MODEL: OVERVIEW
A. Rationale
Current QKD systems have now reached levels of per-
formance essentially comparable to the fundamental lim-
its on the secret capacity [17, 18]. This indicates the
impressive technological maturity that quantum commu-
nications engineering has reached. Conversely, this also
fundamentally limits our hope to experience large perfor-
mance gains for QKD in the future.
Extending the functionality and overcoming the per-
formance limitations of quantum-based secure communi-
cations hence requires to consider a broader picture. This
can consist of pushing further the entanglement frontier,
by developing our ability to send, store and process large
entangled states. Such fundamental efforts will be cru-
cial for developing large-scale quantum information pro-
cessing, however, it requires some complex technological
challenges to be overcome.
The approach we consider in this paper explores a com-
plementary space: consider security models weaker than
unconditional security and characterize the gain in prac-
ticality (i.e. performance and functionality, over cost).
This approach requires a clear bench-marking of the se-
curity gain, with respect to classical cryptography, and
the “security cost” related to the assumptions that have
been introduced.
We propose in this work to explore the benefits that
can be taken from assuming short-term computational
security of one-way function (say AES for short.). This
assumption positions our work in a space outside of un-
conditional security. However, we want to recall here
that such an assumption is more conservative in assum-
ing the long-term security of AES. This latter option is
however implicitly made in the context of many QKD
practical deployments [6–9], when QKD is used to renew
AES encryption keys, leading to a secure communication
construction that is only as secure as AES, and in which
the added value of QKD is highly questionable. [1, 2, 19]
We want to claim that the direction we consider here
might be a rational way out of the real-world quantum
cryptography conundrum: namely to explore a space
of assumptions where quantum cryptography can offer
a clear security advantage over classical cryptography,
namely a world in which one-way-functions would not be
long-term-secure, but could still be used at short-term,
to boost the performance of quantum cryptography be-
yond the fundamental performance bounds [17, 18], that
might be too restrictive for real-world use [20].
B. Main Results
We introduce a novel security model, Quantum
Computational Hybrid (QCH) security model, which
consists of two nested assumptions: first, it assumes that
FIG. 1. A general overview of a QCT construction.
(a) Protocol between authorized Alice and Bob, defining a
X → Y binary channel.
(b) Protocol between authorized Alice and Eve, defining a
X → Z binary channel.Technologically limited Eve (due to
QCH security model) cannot break time-locked encryption
before tcomp and can only store quantum state in quantum
memory during time tcoh < tcomp. As a consequence, Eve is
forced to measure ρxrS before tcoh. At a later at time, after
tcomp, time-locked encryption elapses, and Eve learns S and
performs classical decoding to obtain z as the estimate of x.
an adversary, running an efficient algorithm in polyno-
mial time, can not break a computationally secure en-
cryption scheme before a certain time tcomp, and, sec-
ondly, it assumes that any quantum memory is bound to
decohere within a time tcoh < tcomp. This model could be
seen as a combination of time-release encryption [21] with
the noisy quantum memory model [22]. These assump-
tions, in particular, are well motivated by a technological
assessment: as analyzed in Appendix A coherence time
of the state of the art quantum memories able to store
optically encoded quantum information are significantly
below one second, while some generic computational one-
way functions, such as AES256, are typically assumed to
be secure during decades. Given the large spread, from
O(1) and O(109) s, between the upper bound for tcoh
and lower bound for tcomp the validity of the QCH secu-
rity model can be assumed with a very high confidence
today and leaves also a very large margin for its validity
in the future. An important point being that we aim at
everlasting secure key distribution, for which it is suffi-
cient to guarantee the validity of the QCH model at the
time of protocol execution.
Quantum Computational Timelock: Using the
QCH security model we propose a generic quantum cryp-
tographic construction, that we call, “Quantum Compu-
tational Time-lock” (QCT). A time-lock is a part of a
3locking mechanism commonly found in bank vaults and
other high-security containers, designed to prevent the
opening of the safe or vault until it reaches the preset
time. An authorized employee of the bank can open the
vault, however, any unauthorized thief or attacker trying
to break in the vault cannot open it before this preset
time. Combined with an extra security mechanism, such
as an alarm alerting the Sheriff, the time-lock forms a
very effective security mechanism. Quantum Computa-
tional Time-lock construction will essentially follow the
same principle, however, in that case, a computational
one-way function will play the role of the time-lock mech-
anism, while the decoherence (of quantum storage), plays
the role of the Sheriff.
In the QCT framework authorized parties, Alice and
Bob want to exchange a bit x reliably while guaranteeing
that Eve, who is assumed to have a full copy of the in-
put of the quantum channel, can only learn a negligible
amount of information about x. To reach this objective,
Alice and Bob, that are assumed to share a short-term
secure key k, are first going to set a computational time-
lock : they use a computational encryption scheme Ek to
share a short-term-secure (but potentially large) classi-
cal secret S. The second step consists of an encrypted
quantum communication phase, where Alice encodes the
random bit x as ρxrS , where S is the time-locked secret
and r is some local random string. Upon reception mea-
sures E(ρxrS) using operator MS , defined by the basis S,
obtaining a classical outcome, y, schematically shown in
Figure 1(a).
For an unauthorized adversary Eve, the classical secret
S is time-locked until time tcomp. As a worst-case sce-
nario, Eve can mount her attack using a copy of the input
state ρxrS . However, she cannot store quantum informa-
tion during time longer that tcoh < tcomp and hence must
measure state without knowing S as depicted in Figure
1(b). Her measurement ΠΩ on ρxrS gives classical out-
come Ω. Later at time tcomp, when the time-locked en-
cryption elapses, the secret S is supposed to be revealed
to Eve, which she uses, along with the measurement out-
come Ω, to perform post-measurement classical decoding
leaking to make the guess, z, on the bit x. This strategy
is known as state discrimination with post-measurement
information as described in [23].
Security in QCT framework: The principle idea to
prove security in the QCT framework is to bound Eve’s
accessible information on the key bit x. Accessible infor-
mation is a suitable post-measurement security parame-
ter to prove security against an eavesdropper with time-
limited storage [24]. This security criterion can indeed be
related to the variation distance between the probability
distribution of an ideal key (see section III C). It hence
differs QKD, where Eve has access to a perfect quantum
memory and security definition uses trace distance.
MUB-Quantum Computational Timelock
(MUB-QCT): we also propose an explicit d-dimensional
(power of 2) key agreement protocol, that we call
MUB-QCT, where one bit x is encoded on the qudit
state |Ψxrθ〉 (of index x× (d/2)+r, for r ∈R [0, d/2−1]),
in the MUB basis, θ, chosen among the d + 1 mutually
unbiased bases (MUBs) in dimension d.
To prove the security of the MUB-QCT protocol,
we first show that the eavesdropping reduces to per-
forming an immediate measurement followed by post-
measurement decoding. For this optimal attack strategy,
the upper bound on Eve’s accessible information is deter-
mined by calculating the maximum success probability or
the guessing probability for Eve to retrieve the key (See
section III C).
We prove that when Alice sends m copies of the en-
crypted qudit state, i.e. |Ψxrθ〉m, we can bound Eve’s
accessible information, when performing collective and
non-adaptive attacks, is upper bounded by:
Iacc(X;E) ≤ O
( m√
d
)
(1)
This implies that MUB-QCT enables secure key distribu-
tion with the input state containing up to O(
√
d) photons
when implemented in dimension d, as opposed to QKD
protocols, that are limited O(1) photon per channel use.
This very significant improvement has important conse-
quences on performance and functionality:
• It offers high tolerance channel loss and to detec-
tor noise, resulting in an important and significant
performance boost w.r.t. QKD, characterized by
O(
√
d) multiplication of key rates and an exten-
sion by 25km × log(d) of the attainable distance
over fiber.
• MDI type security guarantee: In MUB-QCT pro-
tocol, Eve’s information is upper-bounded only by
considering the state that Alice inputs. As a conse-
quence, the implementation of Bob’s measurement
device is not required to be trusted, to guarantee se-
curity, i.e. we QCT enjoys some MDI-type security
feature. This characteristic can be very important
in the perspective of practical implementation se-
curity and enables to relax significant engineering
constraints.
• It allows us to realize multiparty key distribution
between one sender and up to O(√d) receivers,
which is impossible in QKD, and could enable the
development of additional network security primi-
tives, on top of QCT.
These results illustrate the benefits of hybrid ap-
proaches to quantum cryptography, making it a promis-
ing route to extend the performance and functionality,
to meet the requirements for future large-scale quantum
infrastructure deployments.
4TABLE I. Overview of different quantum-based key distribution protocols in high dimension. In the table, d is the dimension
of the system, T is the transmittance of the channel, and m is the number of photons that are sent per channel use.
Protocol Security Model Secure Key Rate per
channel use
Performance
QKD: d dimension Information
Theoretic Sec.
∼ T log2(d) - Less than one photon per channel use (m < 1).
- For fixed detection technology (pd) and T = 10
−L/50,
Lmax < 25 log(1/pd).
Flood Light QKD
[28, 29]
Information
Theoretic Sec.
∼ mT [1− h2( e−mT2 )
−Tm2
d
log2
m+d
m
]
- O(m)-fold secret key rate increase w.r.t. QKD.
- no distance increase w.r.t. QKD.
- Security proven for restricted attacks [28, 30].
Quantum Data Locking
Discrete Variable [26]
Time-limited Q
memory
∼ T log2(d) - Security is independent of channel monitoring.
- m = 1 (encoding on single photons).
Quantum Data Locking
Continuous Variable
[27]
Time-limited Q
memory
Direct Reconciliation
DR = 1 + log(T/(1− T )),
Reverse Reconciliation
RR = 1 + log(1/(1− T ))
- Security is independent of channel monitoring.
- Constructions based on random codes.
Q. Comp. Timelock
MUB-QCT [our work]
Time-limited Q
memory
Short-term sec.
encryption
∼ mT log2(
√
d/m) - O(√m)-fold secret key rate increase w.r.t. QKD.
- Security is independent of channel monitoring.
- Security for collective, non-adaptive attacks
C. Related work
Our work is in particular related to the recently pro-
posed idea of Quantum Enigma Machine [25] and Quan-
tum data locking [26, 27] where the security is proved by
upper bound Eve’s accessible information in discrete as
well as continuous variable settings [24]. However, exist-
ing work on Quantum data locking systematically uses
random coding arguments to build and prove the secu-
rity of protocols, making the implementation so far not
possible in practice.
Although further analysis is required on that mat-
ter, we conjecture that a fundamental difference between
Quantum data locking (QDL) and our Quantum Compu-
tational Timelock (QCT) stems from the fact that Dis-
crete Variable QDL constructions need to operate with
a key much smaller than the channel capacity and thus
much smaller than log(d) bits. This requirement stems
from the constraint of obtaining a positive data locking
rate[25]. QCT, on the other hand, leverages on an ad-
ditional short-term-secure encryption assumption. This
enables Alice and Bob to share a secret S that is compa-
rable to, or even possibly much larger than, log(d) bits.
This gives rise to the possibility to use strong locking
schemes, such as one based on a full family of MUBs,
that are moreover easy to implement with multimode co-
herent states, containing m photons on average. This is
precisely what we propose in this article with the MUB-
QCT construction.
On the other hand Quantum Data Locking, operating
in a regime where the key is much smaller than log(d) bits
requires to consider locking constructions over quantum
codewords that are entangled with respect to mode parti-
tions. This leads to constructions for which the measure-
ment that Bob must perform, are in general entangled
measurements between modes, and therefore difficult to
implement in practice.
Flood-light QKD (FL-QKD) [28, 29]. is another re-
cently proposed protocol. It aims at providing perfor-
mance level beyond what QKD is achievable with QKD,
in particular in terms of rate. FL-QKD consists in send-
ing coherent light over a very large number of modes,
while keeping mean photon number per mode below one
to guarantee no-cloning. It is based on a two-way proce-
dure, and the optical storage of a random coherent wave-
front, used to perform a multimode homodyne measure-
ment. FL-QKD could potentially allow Gbit/s secret-key
rates over metropolitan-area distances. However, its cur-
rent security analysis only guarantees protection against
frequency-domain collective attacks and is still vulnera-
ble to block-wise coherent attacks [30]. Moreover, while
it can have a decisive impact on rate (which we also ex-
pect for QCT), FL-QKD cannot be used to extend the
distance, as compared to standard QKD.
5D. Organization
We begin, in Section III, by introducing some notations
and the tools required to discuss the security of the key
establishment schemes we aim at constructing, namely
accessible information security and post-measurement
quantum state discrimination. In Section IV we provide a
detailed description about the formalization of the QCH
security model assumptions and argues about the valid-
ity of this model. In SectionV we describe our main key
establishment protocol MUB-QCT, based on the Quan-
tum Computational Timelock framework, and where the
secret S encodes for the choice of one basis out of a max-
imal set of d+1 MUBs in dimension d. In Section VI, we
analyze the performance of the functional and implemen-
tation security gain that might be obtained with MUB-
QCT, when implemented over high-dimensional coherent
state encodings. We also discuss experimental routes to-
wards this objective. Finally we conclude in Section VII.
III. PRELIMINARIES
We briefly introduce all necessary notation as well as
several important concepts we will need throughout the
paper.
A. Notations
For an integer d, we use the notation [d] = {0, . . . , d−
1}. We denote any random variable by a capital letter,
for example X, distributed according to the distribution
PX over a set X . The realization of a random variables X
is denoted by the lower-case letters x, for x ∈ X . For an
integer n, we define any n-tuple as xn := {x1, . . . , xn} ∈
Xn.
We denote a Hilbert space as H. A quantum state is
a Hermitian operator ρ ∈ H, satisfying Tr(ρ) = 1 and
ρ ≥ 1. Distance between the two states is determined by
the trace norm ||A||1 : Tr
√
A†A, for any operator A ∈ H.
We say two states ρ, σ are -close if 12 ||ρ− σ||1 ≤ .
B. Mutually Unbiased Bases (MUB)
Definition 1 Let Bθ1 = {|eθ10 〉, . . . , |eθ1d−1〉} and Bθ2 =
{|eθ20 〉, . . . , |eθ2d−1〉} be two orthonormal bases in a d di-
mensional Hilbert space. Then, θ1 and θ2 are mutually
unbiased if and only if
∀(i, j) ∈ [d],
∣∣∣〈eθ1i |eθ2j 〉∣∣∣ = 1√
d
(2)
In a d dimension Hilbert space, there exist at most
(d + 1) number of mutually unbiased bases [31]. Ex-
plicit construction of a full set of MUBs is known for
prime power dimension [32] and square dimensions [33].
Throughout this article, we will assume that we can con-
struct the full set of MUBs, denoted by B = [d+ 1].
C. QCT security criterion based on accessible
information
In a general QCT setting, we have two authorized par-
ties, Alice and Bob who share an ephemeral secure key,
k, such that any encryption Ek generated using this se-
cure key k is secure or time-locked for tcomp. Alice and
Bob are connected by a noiseless and authentic classi-
cal channel, and a quantum channel. An unauthorized
Eve has full access to the input of these channel, every
classical (quantum) message communicated between Al-
ice and Bob, over the classical (quantum) channel, can
be wiretapped by Eve and stored in classical (quantum)
memory. However, the quantum storage is bound to de-
cohere within time tcoh < tcomp.
Now, Alice and Bob share a classical secret S between
them, using the encryption Ek(S) and the decryption
Dk(S), as shown in Figure 1(a). Following this, Alice
encodes a bit x ∈ {0, 1}, using the classical secret S, on a
quantum state ρxs and sends it to Bob, over the quantum
channel. Bob measures the the state using a POVM MSY ,
described by the secret S, to obtain an outcome y ∈
{0, 1}.
An adversary Eve can wiretap both Ek(S) and ρxs,
and store them in classical and quantum memory, respec-
tively. However, for Eve Ek(S) is time-locked for tcomp,
while, ρxs fully decoheres within tcoh < tcomp. As a con-
sequence, she is forced to measure her state before tcoh,
using a POVM Πˆ := {ΠˆΩ}. An operator ΠˆΩ gives her an
outcome Ω. Finally, at time tcomp when time-locked en-
cryption Ek(S) elapses, she obtains the classical secret S,
which she use along with Ω to perform post-measurement
decoding to obtain a guess z ∈ {0, 1}.
Under such scenario, a security criterion requires
that the joint probability distribution, PΠXZ(x, z) =
PX(x)P
Πˆ
Z|X(z), should be close to the product of its
marginals PX(x)P
Πˆ
Z (z). Where, P
Πˆ
Z|x(z) is Eve’s con-
ditional probability to obtain z = x,
P ΠˆZ|x(z) =
∑
Ω
P ΠˆΩ|x(Ω)× PZ|ΩS(z) (3)
which is the product of two events, first, the probability
to obtain the measurement outcome Ω i.e., PΩ|x(Ω) =
Tr(ΠˆΩρxs), and second, probability to output the guess
z from Ω given S, i.e., PZ|ΩS(z) = PZ|ΩS(Ω = z = x) =
δxΩ, sum over all the possible value of Ω. Implying,
P ΠˆZ|X(z) =
∑
Ω
Tr(ΠˆΩρxS)δxΩ (4)
and P ΠˆZ (z) =
∑
x PX(x)P
Πˆ
Z|X(z).
6This security criterion is captured by a statistical dis-
tance, i.e., the total variation distance, defined as
∆ := max
Πˆ
1
2
∑
x,z
|P ΠˆiXZ − PX × P ΠˆZ |. (5)
Thus to establish the security, it is required that the vari-
ation distance ∆ should be very small.
The amount of classical information that Eve can ex-
tract from the quantum system ρxθ, by a POVM mea-
surement Πˆ and using post-measurement information,
can be quantified by accessible information, defined as
Iacc(X;E) = max
Πˆ
[I(X;Z)]
= max
Πˆ
[H(X)−H(X|Z)]
= H(X)−min
Πˆ
[H(X|Z)]
≤ H(X)−Hmin(X|Z) (6)
where, we have used the fact that H(·) ≥ Hmin(·) and
Hmin(·) := − log2(Pguess(·)) is the min entropy.
The accessible information Iacc(X;E) is related to the
total variation distance ∆ by the Aliciki-Fannes’ inequal-
ity [34]
Iacc(X;E) ≤ 2∆ log |X|+ η(2∆acc) (7)
where, η = −(·) log(·), and the Pinsker’s inequality [35]
∆ ≤
√
1
2
Iacc(X;E) (8)
These two inequalities imply the effectiveness of acces-
sible information, Iacc(X;E), as a valid security quanti-
fiers. Therefore, to establish security in this setting, it
is required that the accessible information Iacc(X;E) of
Eve on random variable X should be very small. Which,
in result, requires to estimate the upper bound on the
maximum success probability for Eve to guess the bit
correctly, as represented in Equation (6).
D. State discrimination with post measurement
information
To calculate the maximum success probability for Eve,
we will show in Section V B 1, that the above setting in
QCT framework, corresponds to the problem of state dis-
crimination with post-measurement information, as de-
fined in [23]. According to which, the maximum suc-
cess probability for Eve can be calculated for the most
general strategy corresponding to the measurement us-
ing a POVM Πˆ with |X||S| outcomes, each labeled by
the strings Ω = (ω0, . . . , ω|S|−1) i.e., {Πˆω0,...,ω|S|−1}.
Where, each outcome Ω is a string of length |S|, which
equip Eve with possible outputs ωi ∈ {0, 1} for each
i ∈ {0, . . . , |S|−1}. Later when Alice reveals the random
variable S, Eve applies following map fS on the string Ω,
which corresponds to an output z = fS(Ω) = (ωs|i = s)
i.e., the assignment is done by selecting the value ωi cor-
responding to i = s. Finally, Eve guesses the value of x
from the output z = ωs.
The average success probability Pavg, with which Eve
succeeds at guessing x correctly is
Pavg =
∑
xs
∑
Ω
PXS(x, s)P
Πˆ
Z|X(z)
=
1
|X|
1
|S|
∑
xs
∑
Ω
Tr(ΠˆΩρxs)δxωs
=
1
|X|
1
|S|
∑
s
∑
Ω
Tr(ΠˆΩρωss) (9)
where, the relations follows from Equation (3) and (4).
Finally the maximum success probability to guess x is
then obtained by maximizing Pavg over POVM,
Pguess = max
Πˆ
Pavg
= max
Πˆ
1
|X|
1
|S|
∑
s
∑
Ω
Tr(ΠˆΩρωss))
= max
Πˆ
1
|X|
1
|S|
∑
Ω
Tr(ΠˆΩ
∑
s
ρωss) (10)
FIG. 2. (a) Standard state discrimination problem (b) Prob-
lem of state discrimination with post-measurement informa-
tion as depicted in [23]
E. Secure key rate from classical information
As a result of the QCT framework, in the end, we
are in a scenario where, Alice and Bob have access to
a realization of classical random variables X and Y , re-
spectively, whereas an adversary Eve obtains a random
variable Z. Moreover, Eve has no information about X
and Y other than through her knowledge of Z. This
scenario is similar to a key agreement setting by a public
discussion on a broadcasting channel as described in [36],
where two parties Alice and Bob, are willing to share a
pair of secret keys about which an adversary Eve has
no information. Here, Alice and Bob are connected by
7a noiseless and authentic but otherwise completely inse-
cure public broadcasting channel. Alice and Bob share a
short key (k) required for guaranteeing authenticity and
integrity of messages sent over the public channel. Every
message communicated between Alice and Bob can be
wiretapped by Eve, but it is assumed that Eve cannot
insert fraudulent messages nor modify messages on the
channel without being detected.
Under such scenario, the secret-key rate is defined as
the maximal rate at which Alice and Bob can generate a
secret key, such that the secret key generated is the same
for Alice and Bob with very high probability and Eve has
only a negligible amount of (Shannon) information about
it. The lower bound on the key rate in the asymptotic
limit (n → ∞) has been defined by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner
[37] as
K ≥ I(X;Y )− I(X;Z) = H(X|Z)−H(X|Y )
≥ Hmin(X|Z)−H(X|Y ) (11)
where, I(X;Y ) := H(X) − H(X|Y ) and I(X;Z) :=
H(X) − H(X|Z), are the mutual information between
Alice and Bob, and between Alice and Eve, respec-
tively. General scenario and the secret key rate and other
bounds on the secret key rate have been discussed in, [36],
[38], and [39]. The connection of the min-entropy to the
secure key rates has also been studied in [40].
IV. QUANTUM COMPUTATIONAL HYBRID
(QCH) SECURITY MODEL
We consider a hybrid security model by combining a
computational assumption, that there exist a short-term-
secure computational encryption, and conversely assum-
ing that any optical quantum memory is technologically
bound to decohere within a timescale shorter than the
time for which the computational encryption is secure.
This new, Quantum Computational Hybrid (QCH) secu-
rity model, is formally defined as:
1. Short term secure encryption: It assumes that
there exist an encryption scheme Ek, such that for
all message, m1, m2 ∈ M ( where M is the mes-
sage space), and for a time, t, less than some com-
putational time, tcomp, i.e., t < tcomp, the following
holds for an adversary running an efficient algo-
rithm A,
Pr[A(Ek(m1)) = m1]− Pr[A(Ek(m2)) = m1] <  (12)
Where, Pr[h] is the probability of the event h, 
is the negligible function of k. An efficient algo-
rithm A refers to any algorithm which can run in
polynomial time.
2. Time-limited quantum storage: which assumes
that a quantum memory decoheres within time
tcoh, i.e., for input state ρ, the decoherence is de-
fined by a complete positive trace-preserving map
(CPTP) map Nt : ρ → Nt(ρ), such that for any
δ << 1,
1
2
||Ntcoh(ρ)− I||1 ≤ δ (13)
where, tcoh is the coherence time of the quantum
memory such that tcoh << tcomp, and I is the iden-
tity matrix.
FIG. 3. Validity of QCH security model with respect
to existing computational hardness assumption for AES and
demonstrated quantum storage coherence time at single pho-
ton level. For example, assuming tcomp >≥ 105 sec, seems
safe.
These assumptions of QCH model are realistic and
practically motivated, yet, have never been jointly for-
mulated and studied. Firstly, it is reasonable to make
the first assumption as it only requires computational
encryption to be secure for a short time, unlike classical
cryptographic protocols, which assume that encryptions
are difficult to break even after a very long time. For
instance, Top Secret (AES-256 Encryption) is assumed
to be secured for time of the order of 109 sec i.e., ≈ 30
years [41]. Secondly, the practical implementation of an
attack by an adversary on the second assumption will
require efficient optical quantum storage with coherence
time greater than the computational time (tcoh > tcomp).
However, among the recent experimental demonstrations
of quantum memories, the coherence time is limited to
a few seconds. A comparison of efficiency and coher-
ence time of different optical quantum memory systems
is shown in Table [II] (Appendix A). Thus, assuming, for
example, tcomp = 10
5 s ∼ 1 day, leaves a reasonable secu-
rity margin with respect to the state of art in quantum
storage capabilities, as shown in Figure 3.
V. MUB-QCT KEY DISTRIBUTION
PROTOCOL
In this section, we describe the key distribution proto-
col in the QCH security model, using the QCT frame-
work. We call it the MUB-Quanttum Computational
Timelock (MUB-QCT) key distribution protocol, where
the key bits are encoded onto a d-dimensional quantum
state (where d is the power of 2) using full set of mutually
unbiased bases (MUBs, Definition 1) as encoding bases,
schematically shown in Figure 4.
8FIG. 4. Key distribution protocol between authorized party
Alice and Bob. Alice time lock the classical information θ us-
ing encryption function Ek and sends it to Bob, who decrypts
it immediately to obtain θ. Alice then encode the key x on
the quantum state ρxrθ and sends it to Bob over a quantum
channel. Bob measures this state using (θ) and obtain the
measurement outcome y.
Following QCT framework, authorized parties, Alice
and Bob, share some initial password or secret bits k,
such that any encryption Ek generated using this pass-
word is assumed to be secure for short time tcomp, ac-
cording to QCH security model.
In order to construct the cryptographic primitive, Alice
choose the encoding basis as one of the mutually unbi-
ased basis Bθ for θ ∈ [d + 1], represented by a set of d
orthogonal vectors Bθ = {|eθ0〉, . . . , |eθi 〉, . . . , |eθd−1〉}. Fol-
lowing which, the information θ is time-locked as Ek(θ)
and is sent over a classical channel by Alice to Bob. On
receiving, Bob decrypts it immediately using the decryp-
tion function Dk to obtain the time-locked information
θ. Finally, the bit x ∈ {0, 1} is encoded on the ith vector
of the basis Bθ as
|Ψxrθ〉 = |eθixr 〉, where, ixr =
d
2
x+ r, r ∈
[d
2
]
. (14)
Alice sends m copies of the qudit state, |Ψxrθ〉⊗m, to
Bob over a quantum channel. On receiving the qudit
state Bob decodes the message by performing a mea-
surement Mθy , described by the basis θ, and obtain an
outcome y. For a given θ, Bob’s measurement operators
are defined by the POVM,
Mθ0 =
∑
j≤d/2
|eθj 〉〈eθj |, and, Mθ1 =
∑
d/2<j≤d
|eθj 〉〈eθj |. (15)
Bob’s measurement apparatus comprises two detectors
corresponding to the bit value 0 or 1. After n channel
uses, the raw keys are exchanged, following which, Alice
and Bob perform classical post-processing on their ex-
changed raw keys to transform them into a pair of secret
keys.
The security of the protocol is proved by first demon-
strating that under the QCH security model, the opti-
mal attack strategy for a non-authorized party Eve con-
sists of an immediate measurement followed by classi-
cal post-processing on measurement data using the post-
measurement information. Then, for this optimal attack
strategy, we prove the security by bounding Eve’s acces-
sible information, following the discussion from Section
III C. Eve’s accessible information is upper bounded by
estimating the upper bound on the probability to suc-
cessfully guess the key bit, as shown in Equation (10).
A. Description of Protocol
MUB-QCT Protocol
Parameters:
• n: channel use.
• d: dimension of quantum channel between Alice
and Bob. We consider a pure loss channel.
• k: short key shared between Alice and Bob, to be
used for computational encryption Ek which is se-
cure for some computational time tcomp.
• m: number of copies of quantum state per channel
use.
The protocol:
1. Local generation of x and θ and r
• Alice chooses a xn, xi ∈ {0, 1}, MUBs θn,
θi ∈ [d+1] and local randomness rn, ri ∈ [d/2]
uniformly at random.
• She encrypts the bases string and the pair of
subspace string as Ek(θ
n) and sends it to Bob,
who decrypts it immediately to obtain θn.
2. Quantum communication:
• For (i = 1; i ≤ n; i+ +)
– State preparation: Alice prepare a qudit
state |Ψxiriθi〉.
– Distribution: Alice sends m copies of the
qudit system |Ψxiriθi〉⊗m to Bob.
– Measurement: Bob measures each quan-
tum state using a POVM, Mθy , as defined
in (15), with two outcomes, corresponding
to the bit value, and outputs the result yi.
• After n iterations Alice and Bob outputs: (A :
xn;B : yn)
3. Classical post-processing:
• Alice and Bob perform error correction fol-
lowed by a privacy amplification, using a suit-
able universal2 hash function [42, 43], to distill
a secret key.
9B. Security analysis
1. Reduction of Eve’s attack strategy in the QCT security
model
If an adversary Eve tries to intercept the communica-
tion between Alice and Bob, then, to retrieve the key
back she can implement two possible strategies corre-
sponding to the problem of state discrimination with
post-measurement information [23]. These strategies are
1. Strategy S1: Immediate measurement on all in-
coming qubits followed by post-measurement decod-
ing.
For Eve, this strategy corresponds to perform an imme-
diate generalized measurement, ΠˆΩ (see Section V B 2),
on all of the incoming qubits. Stores the outcome of the
measurement Ω in a classical register. She then waits for
time-lock encryption to elapse and later perform post-
measurement decoding using the measurement outcome
Ω and the post-measurement information θ to output z.
1. Strategy S2: Immediate measurement on some of
the incoming qubits and storing the rest in quantum
memory.
This is a strategy where Eve measures l qubits immedi-
ately upon receiving them according to strategy S1 and
stores the rest of (n − l) incoming qubits in her quan-
tum memory. Then she waits for time tcomp until the
time-lock encryption is elapsed to obtain θ and later per-
forms post-measurement decoding on the immediately
measured qubits and performs a projective measurement
in basis θ on the qubits stored in the memory.
FIG. 5. An unauthorized party Eve can not break the time-
lock encryption Ek(θ), to obtain θ, until time tcomp. So when
Alice sends the quantum state, Eve can either store the state
in her quantum memory, with coherence time tcoh, or perform
an immediate measurement on it. Since tcoh < tcomp, the best
strategy for Eve is to perform an immediate measurement ΠΩ,
obtain the measurement outcome Ω, and later at time tcomp,
when the time-locked encryption is elapsed, perform a post-
measurement classical decoding to obtain a guess z.
Proposition 1 Under the assumptions of QCH security
model, following holds
Pguess(S1) > Pguess(S2). (16)
where, Pguess is the guessing probability or the maximum
success probability to retrieve the original message back.
This implies that the optimal attack strategy of an ad-
versary Eve is the strategy S1, to perform immediate
measurement on all incoming qubit states and perform
a post-measurement decoding at time tcomp.
2. Upper bound on Eve’s accessible information
Following Section III C, to prove the security of MUB-
QCT, it is required to bound Eve’s accessible informa-
tion. Which, consequently, require to calculate an upper
bound on Eve’s guessing probability to guess the key bit
correctly. To calculate the guessing probability, we ana-
lyze two cases where Alice sends a single copy and multi-
ple copies of a quantum state per channel use respectively
and calculate the upper bound on the guessing probabil-
ity of Eve.
• Sending one copy of quantum state per channel use
As shown in Section V B 1, the best strategy for an adver-
sary is to measure all incoming qubits immediately upon
receiving follwed by post-measurement decoding, i.e.,
perform state discrimination using post-measurement in-
formation. For this strategy the best immediate measure-
ment corresponds to a POVM (ΠˆΩ), with 2
|θ| outcomes,
as discussed in Section III C, each labeled by the |θ| long
binary strings Ω = ω0, . . . , ω|θ|, for ωθ ∈ X = {0, 1}.
Such that, when the time-locked encryption elapses and
the information about the pair θ is revealed, Eve applies
the following map fθ on the string Ω, which corresponds
to an output z = fθ(Ω). Finally, Eve guesses the value
of x from the output z. The guessing probability Pguess,
with which Eve succeeds at guessing x correctly is calcu-
lated from Equation (10) as,
Pguess = max
ΠˆΩ
1
|x||θ|
∑
Ω
Tr
(
ΠˆΩ
∑
θr
1
|r|ρωθrθ
)
= max
ΠˆΩ
1
|x||θ|
∑
Ω
Tr
(
ΠˆΩF(Ω)
)
≤ max
ΠˆΩ
1
|x||θ|
∑
Ω
λΩTr
(
ΠˆΩ
)
≤ λ
2(d+ 1)
max
ΠˆΩ
∑
Ω
Tr
(
ΠˆΩ
)
=
dλ
2(d+ 1)
∼ λ
2
(17)
Where, ρωθrθ = |eθiωθr 〉〈e
θ
iωθr
|, F(Ω) = ∑θr 1|r|ρωθrθ, and∑
Ω Tr
(
ΠˆΩ
)
= Tr
∑
Ω ΠΩ = Tr(Id) = d. λΩ is the max-
imum eigenvalue of F(Ω) and λ is the maximum of all
{λΩ} for an ensemble of {F(Ω)}. Now the calculation
for guessing probability is translated to the problem of
finding the maximum eigenvalue λ.
To calculate λ, we use the the fact that for any op-
erator A, if v is some unit eigenvector corresponding to
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eigenvalue γ, then ||Av|| = |γ|, which implies |γ| ≤ ||A||,
i.e., the maximum eigenvalue λ for the operator A cor-
responds to its norm. Similarly, for the operator F(Ω)
the maximum eigenvalue corresponds to its norm. Now
we have F(Ω) as the sum of (d+ 1)d/2 rank-1 projectors
ρωθrθ (the sum over r ∈ [d/2] and θ ∈ [d+1]). Therefore,
it is now required to bound the norm of sum of (d+1)d/2
rank-1 projectors. For this we use the following theorem
( which has been used and developed in [44] [45] [46])
Theorem 1 Following inequality holds for the sum of
l rank-1 projectors acting on an arbitrary finite dimen-
sional Hilbert space Cd
||O1 + . . .+Ol|| ≤ 1 + (l − 1) cosφ
cosφ = max
i,j>1
||OiOj || (18)
Proof of Theorem 1 (Appendix D).
In our case we have l = (d+ 1)d/2 and cosφ = 1|r|2√d ,
as |〈eθ1i |eθ2j 〉| = 1/
√
d. Following which we have
λ ≤ ||F (Ω)|| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∑
θr
1
|r|ρωθrθ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1 +
d
2 (d+ 1)− 1
|r|2√d
λ ≤ 1 + d(d+ 1)− 2
2d2
√
d
(19)
Finally the guessing probability is then,
Pguess ≤ λ
2
≤ 1
2
+
1√
d
− 2
d(d+ 1)
√
d
(20)
implying, ∣∣∣Pguess − 1
2
∣∣∣ < 1√
d
(21)
Thus, Pguess for large value of d converges to
1
2 , which
is equal to classical guessing the random bit. Following
which, the upper bound on Eve’s accessible information
from Equation (6) is
Iacc(X;E) ≤ 1 + log2
(1
2
+
1√
d
)
≤ log2
(
1 +
2√
d
)
≤ 1
ln 2
O
( 2√
d
)
(22)
where, we have used the identity that ln(1 + x) ≤ x. As
a result, Iacc(X;E) for large value of d converges to 0.
So, hiding information in high dimension results better
security against eavesdropping.
• Sending multiple copies of quantum state per chan-
nel use
We now turn our focus on calculating the guessing
probability for adversary when Alice send m copies of
the quantum state per channel use. We consider an at-
tack strategy for Eve, where she can store the m-copies
in her quantum memory, perform any compatible mea-
surement on all m-copies before her quantum memory
decohers i.e., within time tcoh, and finally when she ob-
tain post measurement information, at time tcomp, per-
form classical post-measurement decoding. She can ei-
ther measure all m-copies together, corresponding to a
clooective and non-adaptive measurement or perform an
adaptive measurement [47, 48], corresponding to step by
step optimized measurement. For instance, in the sim-
plest scenario she can performs an optimal measurement
on the first copy use the outcome of the measurement to
define the measurement on the next copy and finally the
last measurement outcome decides the guess. For the
security analysis with multiple copies we consider only
the non adaptive attacks, corresponding to collectively
measuring all m-copies immediately upon receiving.
This non-adaptive strategy is again equivalent to the
problem of state discrimination using post measurement
information, following which the best measurement for
an adversary is to measure all the copies collectively by a
POVM ΠΩ, with 2
|θ| outcomes labeled by the string Ω =
ω0, . . . , ω|θ|, for ωθ ∈ {0, 1}. The guessing probability is
then
Pguess(m) = max
ΠˆΩ
1
|x||θ|m
∑
Ω
Tr
(
ΠˆΩ
∑
θr
1
|r|m ρ
⊗m
ωθrθ
)
=
1
|x||θ|m maxΠˆΩ
∑
Ω
Tr
(
ΠˆΩFm(Ω)
)
≤ λm
2(d+ 1)m
max
ΠˆΩ
∑
Ω
Tr
(
ΠˆΩ
)
Pguess(m) ≤ d
mλm
2(d+ 1)m
∼ λm
2
(23)
where, Fm(Ω) = 1|r|m
∑
θr ρ
⊗m
ωθrθ
, and
∑
Ω Tr
(
ΠˆΩ
)
=
dm. λm is the maximum eigenvalue of all ensemble of
{Fm(Ω)}. Now we have
λm ≤ ||Fm(Ω)|| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∑
θr
1
|r|m ρ
⊗m
ωθrθ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
θr
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1|r|m ρ⊗mωθrθ∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤∑
θr
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1|r|ρωθrθ∣∣∣∣∣∣m
≤
(∣∣∣∣∣∣∑
θr
1
|r|ρωθrθ
∣∣∣∣∣∣)m ≤ λm. (24)
Where, the second and the third relation follows from
the Triangle inequality and Cauchy–Schwarz inequality
respectively. As a result we obtain guessing probability
Pguess(m) ≤ λ
m
2
≤ 1
2
(
1 +
d
2 (d+ 1)− 1
|r|2√d
)m
≤ 1
2
(
1 +
2√
d
− 4
d2
√
d
)m
(25)
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For large value of d∣∣∣Pguess(m)− 1
2
∣∣∣ < m√
d
+ o
( 1√
d
)
(26)
Following which, the upper bound on Eve’s accessible
information is
Iacc(X;E)m ≤ log2
(
1 +
2m√
d
)
(27)
≤ 1
ln 2
O
(2m√
d
)
. (28)
This implies that m < O(√d) copies can be sent, while
the accessible information is still negligible. For example,
if d = 106 then m < 103 can be sent while still guaran-
teeing the security of the key.
Comparison with Helstrom bound: Interestingly,
the guessing probability for state discrimination without
post measurement information, corresponding to the Hel-
strom bound, when sending single copy of the quantum
state is
PHelstrom =
1
2
(
1 +
||ρ0 − ρ1||1
2
)
(29)
where ρx =
1
|r||θ|
∑
rθ ρxrθ. Following which, a simple
calculation gives ||ρ0 − ρ1||1 = 2/
√|θ|, as a result of
which for full set of MUBs,
PHelstrom =
1
2
+
1
2
√
d+ 1
(30)
Implying, ∣∣∣PHelstrom − 1
2
∣∣∣ ≤ 1
2
√
d+ 1
<
1√
d
(31)
Similarly when sending m-copies of the quantum state
ρ⊗mx , the guessing probability corresponding to the Hel-
strom bound is
PHelstrom(m) =
1
2
(
1 +
||ρ⊗m0 − ρ⊗m1 ||1
2
)
≤ 1
2
(
1 +
m||ρ0 − ρ1||1
2
)
≤ 1
2
+
m
2
√
d+ 1
(32)
Implying, ∣∣∣PHelstrom(m)− 1
2
∣∣∣ ≤ m
2
√
d+ 1
(33)
Consequently, the expressions of guessing probability,
Equation (30) and (32), for state discrimination with-
out post measurement information are equivalent to the
expression in Equation (20) and (25), for state discrim-
ination with post-measurement information. This im-
plies that an adversary does not gain any significant ad-
vantage by waiting for post measurement information at
time tcomp, and is thus restricted to classical eavesdrop-
ping.
3. Reduction to key agreement from classical information
As a result of the strategy S1, at the end of the proto-
col, Eve learns a classical string z. She has no knowledge
on the secret key s, other than her knowledge of z. This
setting is similar to the setting for classical secret key
agreement by a public discussion on a broadcasting chan-
nel as described in Section III E. Following this, the lower
bound on the key rate in the asymptotic limit (n → ∞)
is defined by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [37] as
K ≥ I(X;Y )− Iacc(X;E) (34)
Which, from Equation (6) and the relation I(X;Y ) =
H(X)−H(X|Y ) is,
K ≥ Hmin(X|Z)−H(X|Y ) (35)
To decode the key bit, Bob measures in the basis θ
described by a POVM Mθy , Equation (15). His measure-
ment apparatus consists of two detectors, such that a
click in each corresponds to one of the bit value i.e., 0 or
1. Now, let, pc be the probability that there is a correct
detection given that there is a click in the detector, and
let, pe be the probability that there is a wrong detection
given that there is a click in the detector. Thus, we have
H(X|Y ) = −pc log pc − pe log pe. (36)
For Bob’s optimal measurement, Alice and Bob will
asymptotically achieve about H(X|Y ) bits of common
randomness, per channel use. This is the maximum
amount to error-correcting information that Alice needs
to transmit to Bob for each channel use.
For a lossy channel, the secret key rate per channel use
is calculated as
K ≥(1− (1− T )m)Hmin(X|Z)−H(X|Y )
≥(1− (1− T )m)(− log(Pguess(X|Z))
+ pc log pc + pe log pe). (37)
In practice, the term of the right side hand, H(X|Y ) can
be directly observed in a given implementation of the pro-
tocol (see Appendix (C)) and Pguess(X|Z) is calculated
in Equation (25). Following this, the secret key rate per
channel use as a function of distance is plotted in Figure
(6).
VI. ANALYSIS OF MUB-QCT PERFORMANCE
ENVELOPPE
A. Improved rate and reachable distance
We proved that when performing MUB-QCT using a d-
dimensional quantum system, m <
√
d copies of a quan-
tum state can be sent per channel use. This ability to
send multiple copies has a striking consequence as it can
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FIG. 6. Plot of key rate per channel use as a function of distance for, (a) Typical QKD Field Deployment (standard fiber,
InGaAs single-photon detectors) [51] (b) Experiment in the Lab [50] (low-loss fiber, SNSPDs). The plots are given for different
values of d (number of modes) and are obtained by maximizing the key rate against the mean photon number m.
offer high tolerance to the error in detection due to chan-
nel loss, resulting in an important and significant perfor-
mance boost, characterized by a O(
√
d) multiplication
of key rates and an extension by 25km × log(d) of the
attainable distance over fiber. This is evident from the
Figure (6), where the key rate (Equation (37)) is plotted
for different values of d and is optimized by maximizing
the key rate for different value of m. Analyzing the plots,
we found that as we go to high dimensions the key rate
per channel use increases. For d ∼ 10 the performance
of the MUB-QCT is comparable to that of BB84 proto-
col. The performance is comparable to the single-mode
PLOB bound for d ∼ 102 and for d > 102, there is a
significant improvement in the performance.
B. Coherent state encoding
A coherent state have photons distributed in the Pois-
son distribution, i.e., the probability of detecting n-
photons in a coherent state is
Pµ(n) =
µne−µ
n!
(38)
Where, µ = |α|2 is the average number of photons. In
the limit, where the mean photon number sent by Alice is
very large, the Poisson distribution can be approximated
to a Gaussian distribution with the mean of the distri-
bution µ and the standard deviation
√
µ. The average
number of photons that can hit the detector is then equal
to the mean photon number of the coherent state. We
showed that the upper bound on the number of copies of
the quantum state that Alice can send, such that Eve’s
accessible information on the secret key is less than the
mutual information between Alice and Bob is m <
√
d.
This implies that, if a coherent state with the number
of photons µ, for µ + 4
√
µ <
√
d, is prepared by Alice,
then with very high probability (corresponding to the 4
σ confidence, i.e., 99.994%), Eve’s accessible information
on the secret key can be bounded to be less than the
mutual information between Alice and Bob. As a result,
MUB-QCT is well suited to be implemented with contin-
uous variables, which make use of only standard telecom
components that are manageable, cheaper, much more
mature from a technological point of view, and most suit-
able candidates for long-range quantum communication.
C. Implementation with realistic hardware
One challenge of the MUB-QCT implementation will
consist in operating the protocol with high-dimensional
encodings. However, existing time or spectral encoding
techniques indicate the possibility to operate with d as
large of 103 and possibly 105 − 108 [29, 49] with existing
or near-term technologies.
Possibility of achieving such a large number of modes
experimentally, allows us to realize much better perfor-
mance as compare to QKD, with economical and handy
detectors. It makes the requirement for a very good
single-photon detector optional. For example, super-
conducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs),
used in [50] to perform secure quantum key distribution
over 421 km, which have very low dark count rates of
10−8 and efficiency of 66%, however, are very expensive.
Figure(6)) illustrate that MUB-QCT would allow to ob-
tain a very significant boost in key rates and distance,
notably when operated with economical and handy de-
tectors InGaAs [51], where reachable distance could be
brought from 150 km to possibly 300 km, and possibly
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rates brought to Gbit/s values over metropolitan dis-
tances.
Moreover, in MUB-QCT, the number of detectors re-
mains constant irrespective of the dimension of the quan-
tum system. As mentioned earlier, the measurement ap-
paratus consists of two detectors, such that a click in
each corresponds to one of the bit value i.e., 0 or 1. This
is completely in contrast to the high-dimensional QKD,
where, the detectors requirement scales linearly with d.
The high-dimensional QKD is equivalent to performing
QKD d-times in parallel for which the key rate boost is
d-times that of single QKD, but comes at the cost of
d expensive detectors. Furthermore, performing QKD d-
times in parallel does not provide any gain in the commu-
nication distance, as the reachable distance is the same as
that of a single QKD system. Thus, these notable advan-
tage makes the implementation of MUB-QCT far more
efficient and cost-effective, making it a good candidate
for future quantum networks.
FIG. 7. Multiparty MUB-QCT: m copies of the state |Ψxrθ〉
generated can be sent to m authorized parties (Bob) simulta-
neously, allowing them to distill same key together.
D. Multiparty key distribution
The possibility of sending multiple copies of the quan-
tum state per channel use can be exploited to realize
multiparty key distribution in the QCH security model.
In principle, m multiple copies prepared by Alice can
be transmitted to at most m authorized Bobs, allowing
them to distill the same key, as depicted in Figure (7). A
general description of a m-party MUB-QCT distribution
would consist of,
• Alice and m authorized parties exchange the clas-
sical secret (encoding bases) using a short term se-
cure encryption.
• Alice prepares m-identical copies of a qudit state
using the classical secret and send one copy to each
of the m-parties.
• Each party then measures the individual state as
directed by the classical secret.
• After multiple channel use, they perform informa-
tion reconciliation on their strings to distill a secret
key.
Its clear that in a d-dimension there can be at most m <√
d parties. However, to enhance the performance per
party the number of parties can be reduced to m′ < m
allowing to send on average m/m′ copies of the same
state per channel per party.
E. MDI-type security
Figure (8), presents the trust assumptions required on
hardware to prove security in (a) prepare and measure
QKD, (b) MDI QKD, and (c) MUB-QCT. In general,
hardware in Alice and Bob’s labs comprise classical stor-
age, a classical processing device and a device to per-
form quantum operations. This hardware may require
some trust factor depending on their utility in the proto-
col. For instance, in preparation and measure type QKD
protocols it is assumed that these devices work exactly
according to their specifications, and are shielded, i.e.,
they do not leak any information from leaking out of the
lab. As a result of this, it is required for Alice to know
the specifications of devices in Bob’s lab, in another way,
the security of the protocol inherently depends on the
security of these devices. However, such a condition is
difficult to ensure when implementing the protocol, as
many attacks have been demonstrated to be directed to-
wards quantum devices [52–54].
In Measurement Device Independent (MDI) QKD
[55, 56], any detector vulnerability is removed by making
no trust assumption on the measurement devices, which
is the most crucial part of the implementation and quan-
tum transmitter and only classical processing devices are
assumed to work according to their specifications. Conse-
quently, the measurement device is located outside Alice
and Bob’s lab, as shown in the Figure (8). As a re-
sult, the security of the protocol does not depend on the
security of measurement devices, offering an important
implementation security advantage.
Device independent (DI) QKD [57, 58] is another se-
curity framework providing unparalleled security, which
holds irrespective of the quality and internal working of
quantum devices (transmitter and receiver). DI-QKD
protocols derive their security from an important ingre-
dient which allows a “test for quantumness” based on the
violation of a Bell-inequality [59–62]. Such test for quan-
tumness can only guarantee the security of the crypto-
graphic protocol if it allows the violation of Bell inequal-
ity in a loophole-free way (in particular, this means that
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FIG. 8. Trust assumptions on the hardware, required to prove security in different key distribution protocols. Elements that
are trusted to work according to their specifications are represented in orange color, while, for elements in blue color, no
assumptions are made on the internal working and specifications, removing an important constraint on the security of the
protocol. The black color boundary represents the shield, which ensures that these devices do not leak any information out of
the lab. In the figure shorthand notations are defined as, TQ: quantum transmitter, RQ: quantum receiver C: classical, and,
Q quantum. The yellow color key is a short key required to generate short-term-secure encryption in QCT and also serve as
an initial password to authenticate the classical channel.
the experiments should be executed without making any
assumptions that could otherwise be exploited by Eve
to compromise the security of a cryptographic protocol).
However, DI-QKD makes some important assumptions
like, there is no information leakage from trusted parties’
locations and Alice and Bob have access to trusted ran-
domness. These two assumptions are the cryptographic
analogous of the locality (no-signaling) and free-will loop-
hole respectively. If these, two assumptions can not be
met (loopholes can not be closed), a secure key distribu-
tion (proper Bell violation) can not be guaranteed. This
high level of security can only be established under con-
ditions which are very difficult to achieve experimentally,
as among the recent experimental demonstration [63–
65], claiming loophole-free Bell inequality violation, have
however only closed the door on local and non-contextual
theories with fake determinism and are not completely
loophole-free [66]. Moreover, it has already been shown
that quantum theory, with all its seemingly nonlocal pre-
dictions, can be given a fully local-realistic interpretation
[67–69]. As a result, DI-QKD although, guarantee un-
precedented security, yet, it is not the panacea for secure
key distribution as it is difficult to implement and still
requires important trust assumptions, that may not be
much easier to comply with, than the one for prepare and
measure QKD.
In Quantum Computational Timelock, MUB-QCT
protocol, Alice and Bob are not required to estimate the
errors by monitoring their channel, to bound Eve’s infor-
mation on the secret key. To bound Eve’s information,
Alice and Bob are required to calculate only the accessi-
ble information of the Eve, which depends on the input
state prepared by Alice’s quantum source and does not
depend on Bob’s measurement device. As a result, Alice
is not required to know the specifications of measure-
ment devices on Bob’s side. Thus, the security is in-
dependent of any trust assumption on the measurement
device. However, this kind of security is guaranteed only
if the assumptions of the QCH security model holds. We
call this, MDI-type security, as the security is similar to
the MDI QKD protocol provided some additional restric-
tions.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new QCH security model,
using which we constructed a MUB-QCT key distribution
protocol, where we encode a bit on a qudit system using a
basis among the full set of MUBs. We prove the security
of the protocol by estimating the upper bound on the
accessible information for an adversary, which is done by
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calculating the maximum success probability to guess the
key bit. The main ingredient to calculate the guessing
probability was to show that the best strategy for an
adversary corresponds to state discrimination with post-
measurement information on all incoming qubits.
We proved our main result that when Alice sends m
copies of the quantum state, then for a collective and non-
adaptive attack strategy, Eve’s accessible information on
the key bit is Iacc(X;E)m ≤ 1ln 2O
(
2m√
d
)
. Implying that
m <
√
d of copies can be sent by Alice to Bob, while
still bounding Eve’s accessible information less than Al-
ice Bob correlation. As a result of which, we observe a
significant improvement in the key rate when we opt for
high dimensional encoding as evident from Figure 6.
We also showed that the security of QCT can be guar-
anteed without monitoring the error rate and thus there
is no need to trust the implementation of Bob’s measure-
ment apparatus. This “MDI-type” security relaxes some
important engineering constraints concerning QKD. The
fact that the error rate does not need to be evaluated
with high precision indeed represents a significant prac-
tical advantage over QKD protocols such as decoy-state
QKD, where finite-size effects can strongly affect the se-
cure key rates attainable in practice.
Hence, our results illustrated that hybrid approaches
to quantum cryptography may constitute a practical
and therefore very promising rout to extend the perfor-
mance and functionality of quantum cryptography, and
to meet the requirements associated with the deployment
of large-scale quantum communication infrastructures.
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Appendix A: Validity of time-limited quantum
storage assumption
The practical implementation of an attack by an ad-
versary on the time-limited quantum storage assump-
tion will require efficient quantum storage with coherence
time greater than the computational time (tcoh > tcomp),
i.e., an adversary needs to be able to store quantum infor-
mation for a time greater than the time for which encryp-
tion is assumed to be secure, and retrieve it on-demand
later. A natural question to be asked is how plausible
it is to achieve this requirement? To provide the an-
swer we discuss today’s quantum storage capabilities, by
analyzing different experimental demonstrations of state
of the art quantum memories. For the comparison, we
only consider those experimentally demonstrated quan-
tum memories,
• Which have shown storage of optically interfaced
quantum light
• Storing light at a single photon level (quantum
regime).
Based on the approach to light-matter coupling, we cat-
egorize quantum memories into two categories. The first
is a single atom-based quantum memory, where a single
atom is placed in a highly reflective optical cavity. Light
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Type of Quantum Memory Approaches Platform Storage & retrieval Coherence Time
Efficiency
Trapped ions [71] Cold atoms 16% 139µs
Nuclear spin SiV centre [73] NA 115ns
Single atom
based Nuclear spin NV centre
quantum memories (proposed)[72] 25% 40ns
Cavity QED [76] Cold atoms 39% 3µs
AFC [82] Solid state 0.5% 0.53s
EIT [84] Cold gas 56% 54µs
Ensemble
based Raman scheme [79] Cold atoms 65% 60µs
quantum memories
Cavity [83] Cavity 72% 110µs
DLCZ[87] Cold gas 82% 0.9µs
GEM [86] Cold gas 87% 1ms
TABLE II. Quantum storage time of different state of the art quantum memory systems. For the comparison, we considered
experimentally demonstrated quantum memories which have shown storage of optically encoded quantum light, and are at
single-photon level.
shining into the cavity repeatedly reflects from its mir-
rors which can dramatically increase the absorption of an
incoming photon. Another approach is ensemble-based
quantum memories or collective coupling. An ensemble
of atoms is prepared in the ground state which is in a
large superposition. The incoming photon is absorbed
by the ensemble such that the state of the photon is de-
localized over all the atoms in the ensemble. The collec-
tive state is then efficiently converted back into a single
photon with a well-defined direction. We also report the
storage and retrieval efficiency of these memories.
1. Single atom-based quantum memories:
Memories such as trapped ions: have been shown to
exhibit long coherence times on the order of 10 min
[70] though, not optically interfaced. Nevertheless, these
memories can be optically interfaced by tuning the op-
tical resonator’s frequency near an atomic transition to
create a dipole coupling between the atoms and the cav-
ity field. For storage of photonic qubit in a single atom,
the overall storage and retrieval efficiency of 16% for co-
herence time of 139µs was recorded [71].
Quantum memory based on solid-state nuclear spin
systems, such as Silicon–vacancy centres (SiVC) in di-
amonds have shown a coherence time of 115ns [72]. For
Nitrogen-vacancy centers (NVC) in diamonds an experi-
ment was proposed [73], which offers to achieve a coher-
ence time of 40ns with an overall efficiency of 25%. A
detailed review of optically interfaced solid-state quan-
tum memories can be found here, [74].
Superconducting circuit QED are hybrid systems that
have shown to exhibit a coherence time up to 100s [75].
However, since microwave photons are not well suited for
long-distance communication, an optical-to-microwave
interface is needed which introduces noise due to optical
interactions. Heralded transfer of a polarization qubit
from a photon onto a single atom with 39% efficiency
and storage time of 3µs was realized [76].
2. Ensemble-based quantum memories:
These memories have preferential importance due to
their strong light-matter coupling and high bandwidths.
The collective state in an ensemble of atoms is more ro-
bust to environmental dephasing. A large ensemble facil-
itates storing multiple photons in a single memory. A list
of techniques has been deployed to develop such quantum
memories.
Warm vapor Raman memory schemes have been used
to efficiently store GHz-bandwidth photons for up to
nanoseconds with an efficiency of 30%[77, 78] and with
19
cold atoms, the efficiency is of 65% with coherence
time 60 µs [79]. Electromagnetically Induced Trans-
parency (EIT) is an optical phenomenon in atoms that
uses quantum interference to induce transparency into
an otherwise resonant and opaque medium. For quan-
tum memory application using EIT, the coherence time
was recorded up to 54 µs with an efficiency of 56%[84].
Both EIT and Raman memory schemes are optically con-
trolled quantum memories, where a strong optical pulse
is used to induce the absorption of photons into the stor-
age medium. The main challenge of optically controlled
quantum memories is the noise, in particular, as the
single-photon level signal is emitted with a strong control
beam, due to which the residual control beam becomes a
serious source of noise in the single-photon signal band.
Another important scheme of quantum memory is
called engineered absorption, which is based on the pho-
ton echo effect. There are two important approaches
in this scheme: Controlled Reversible Inhomogeneous
Broadening (CRIB) (Gradient Echo Memories GEM)
and Atomic Frequency Combs (AFC). Memories designed
using the GEM method have shown very high efficiency
up to 90% with coherence time-limited to 100 µs. Laser-
cold atoms used for GEM have produced an efficiency
of 87% with a coherence time of 0.6 ms[86]. Solid-state
AFC has shown lifetime storage up to few hundreds of
ms, however, the efficiency is very low [80–82].
An optical cavity is an effective method to enhance
atom-light coupling strength. The cavity retains the pho-
ton and releases it when needed. The main advantages of
a cavity-based quantum memory are its simple and inex-
pensive configuration and the very broad working wave-
length range. However, due to the loss of the cavity, it
cannot provide a long storage time. It has shown the
efficiency of 72% with the coherence time of 110 µs [83].
Analysis: Our review indicates that among the re-
cent experimental demonstrations of quantum memories
the coherence time is limited to the few seconds. A com-
parison of efficiency and coherence time of different quan-
tum memory systems is shown in Table [II]. Figure (3) il-
lustrates the analysis of the validity QCH security model.
On the timeframe, the red shaded area on the left rep-
resents the state of art quantum memories which can
attack the QCH security model and have coherence time
of order os a second i.e., O(1)s. The red shaded area on
the right represents the time-limit for which AES-256 en-
cryption is assumed to be secure i.e., 109s[41]. The green
shaded region in the center represents the high assurance
region for the validity of the QCH security model. Thus,
assuming for example tcomp = 10
5 s ∼ 1 day leaves a rea-
sonable security margin, with respect to the state of art
in quantum storage capabilities.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
We consider the case where the noise is Markovian in
nature, that is, the family {Nt}t>0 is a continuous one-
parameter semi-group
N0 = I and Nt1+t2 = Nt1 ◦ Nt2 . (B1)
Thus for Markovian evolution of state i.e., ρ→ Nt1(ρ)→
Nt1+t2(ρ) we have following data processing inequality
[88],
H(X|ρ) ≤ H(X|Nt1(ρ)) ≤ H(X|Nt1+t2(ρ)) (B2)
The entropy associated with the strategy S1 and strategy
S2 are
HS1 = H(X|ρxnθn) (B3)
HS2 = H(X|Ntcomp(ρxn−lθn−l)) +H(X|ρxlθl) (B4)
Now since tcoh < tcomp then following the data processing
inequalities from Equation (B2), we have
H(X|Ntcoh(ρxn−lθn−l)) ≤ H(X|Ntcomp(ρxn−lθn−l))
(B5)
Which implies
HS2 ≥ H(X|Ntcoh(ρxn−lθn−l)) +H(X|ρxlθl) (B6)
Given the fact that the quantum state at the end of tcoh
is  close to the identity I, we have
H(X|Ntcoh(ρxn−lθn−l)) ≥ H(X|ρxn−lθn−l) (B7)
Which implies,
HS2 ≥ H(X|ρxn−lθn−l) +H(X|ρxlθn−l)
HS2 ≥ H(X|ρxnθn)
HS2 ≥ HS1 (B8)
Finally, this proves
Pguess(S1) > Pguess(S2). (B9)
Appendix C: Calculation for secret key rate
Consider a lossy channel, with T the transmittance of
the channel, defined as T = 10−αL/10, α = 0.2dB/km.
Let there be n detectors, with η be the detector efficiency,
V be the visibility of the detection and pdark the dark-
count probability per detector then,
1. When sending m-copies, the probability that at-
least one copy reaches one of the detector is (1 −
(1−T )m) and the probability that no signal reaches
the detector is (1− T )m.
2. The probability that there is click due to signal in
a detector is
P1 = P [click due to signal]
=
( m∑
i=1
Cmi (Tη)
i(1− Tη)m−i
)
. (C1)
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The probability that the signal is detected correctly
in a good detector is
P2 = P [click due to signal in a good detector]
=
( m∑
i=1
Cmi (Tη)
i(1− Tη)m−i.V i
)
. (C2)
Similarly, the probability that the signal is detected
correctly in the bad detectors
P3 = P [click due to signal in bad detectors]
=
( m∑
i=1
Cmi (Tη)
i(1− Tη)m−i.(1− V )i
)
(C3)
3. If there are n detectors the probability of click in
k ≤ n detectors due to dark counts is
P4 = P [click in k detectors due to dark count]
= Cnk (pdark)
k(1− pdark)n−k (C4)
Which for k = 1 is npdark(1 − pdark)n−1 ≈ npdark
for pdark << 1, and the probability that there is no
click due to dark count is, (1− pdark)n. Thus, the
probability that there is click in a good detector
due to dark counts is
P5 = P [click in good detector due to dark count]
= npdark
1
n
= pdark. (C5)
Similarly, the probability that there is click in the
bad detectors due to dark counts is
P6 = P [click in bad detector due to dark count]
= npdark
n− 1
n
= (n− 1)pdark. (C6)
4. Probability that there is a click in the detector is
P[click due to signal]× P[click in a detector due to
dark count]
P [click] =
( m∑
i=1
Cmi (Tη)
i(1− Tη)m−i
)
× npdark (C7)
Let Pright is the probability that there is a click in
a detector and is correctly detected, while, Pwrong the
probability that there is a click in a detector and an error
in detection. Then, the probability Pright is then the sum
of three different events
Pright =P [click due to signal in good detector and no click due to dark counts]
+ P [no click due to signal and there is click due to dark count in a good detector]
+ P [click due to signal in good detector and click due to dark count in a good detector]
=
( m∑
i=1
Cmi (Tη)
i(1− Tη)m−i.V i
)
(1− pdark)n + (1− Tη)mpdark
+
( m∑
i=1
Cmi (Tη)
i(1− Tη)m−i.V i
)
pdark (C8)
Similarly, the probability pwrong is the sum of three different events
Pwrong =P [click due to signal in bad detector and no click due to dark counts]
+ P [no click due to signal and there is click due to dark count in bad detectors]
+ P [click due to signal in bad detector and click due to dark count in bad detectors]
=
( m∑
i=1
Cmi (Tη)
i(1− Tη)m−i.(1− V )i
)
(1− pdark)n + (1− Tη)m(n− 1)pdark
+
( m∑
i=1
Cmi (Tη)
i(1− Tη)m−i.(1− V )i
)
(n− 1)pdark (C9)
Let, pc be the probability that there is a correct detection
given that there is a click in detector, and let, pe be the
probability that there is a wrong detection given that
there is a click in detector, then
pc =
Pright
P [click]
(C10)
pe =
Pwrong
P [click]
(C11)
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Assuming that the error in detection is uniformly dis-
tributed over n− 1 detectors then,
H(X|Y ) = −pc log pc − pe log pe
n− 1 . (C12)
Hence, for a lossy channel, the key rate is then
K ≥(1− (1− T )m)Hmin(X|Z)−H(X|Y )
≥(1− (1− T )m)(− log(Pguess(m)))
+ pc log pc + pe log
pe
n− 1 (C13)
Appendix D: Bounding the norm of sum of l rank-1
projector
Following inequality holds for the sum of l rank-1 pro-
jectors acting on an arbitrary finite dimensional Hilbert
space Cd
||O1 + . . .+Ol|| ≤ 1 + (l − 1) cosφ
cosφ = max
i,j>1
||OiOj || (D1)
Proof: Let us introduce an an auxiliary Hilbert space
Cl, and define a standard basis |i〉, i = 1, . . . , l, for this
space. Consider then an operator Q acting on Cl ⊗ Cd
Q =
∑
i
|1〉〈i| ⊗Oi (D2)
which is a block matrix with the first blockrow containing
the projectors Oi. Using the fact that ||Q†Q|| = ||QQ†||,
we have
QQ† = |1〉〈1| ⊗
∑
i
Oi,
Q†Q =
∑
ij
|i〉〈j| ⊗OiOj (D3)
Clearly ||QQ†|| = ||O1 + · · · + Ol||, therefore, it is now
the task to bound ||QQ†||. We can write
Q†Q =
∑
i
|i〉〈i| ⊗Oi +
l−1∑
j=1
∑
i
|i〉〈i⊕ j| ⊗OiOi⊕j (D4)
where ⊕ denotes addition modulo l. This decomposition
amounts to writing Q†Q as a block diagonal matrix plus
a sum of l − 1 matrices, each with a block structure and
containing only displaced diagonals (i.e. have the struc-
ture of a block permutation matrix).
The first term of the right had side of the above equa-
tion has operator norm∣∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
|i〉〈i| ⊗Oi
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = max
i
||Oi|| = 1 (D5)
since the operator norm of a block diagonal operator is
the maximal operator norm of any block, which in our
case is unity. For each of the remaining terms we can use
the fact that the operator norm, being equal to the largest
singular value, is invariant under the transformationQ→
UQV where U and V are unitary operators. Choosing
U = 1⊗ 1 and Vj =
∑
i |i⊕ j〉 ⊗ 1, we see that
U
∑
i
|i⊕ j〉 ⊗OiOi⊕jVj =
∑
i
|i〉〈i| ⊗OiOi⊕j (D6)
and thus∣∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
|i〉〈i⊕ j| ⊗OiOi⊕j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = max
i
||OiOi⊕j || (D7)
again due to the block structure of the transformed
matrix. Since maxi ||OiOi⊕j || ≤ maxi,j>1 ||OiOi⊕j || =
cosφ, we can place the same bound cosφ on each of the
l − 1 terms. Finally by using repeatedly the triangle in-
equality we obtain
||O1 + . . .+Ol|| ≤ 1 + (l − 1) cosφ, (D8)
